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Cross-situational word learning is based on the notion that a learner can determine the
referent of a word by finding something in common across many observed uses of that
word. Here we propose an adaptive learning algorithm that contains a parameter that
controls the strength of the reinforcement applied to associations between concurrent
words and referents, and a parameter that regulates inference, which includes built-in
biases, such as mutual exclusivity, and information of past learning events. By adjusting
these parameters so that the model predictions agree with data from representative
experiments on cross-situational word learning, we were able to explain the learning
strategies adopted by the participants of those experiments in terms of a trade-off
between reinforcement and inference. These strategies can vary wildly depending on
the conditions of the experiments. For instance, for fast mapping experiments (i.e.,
the correct referent could, in principle, be inferred in a single observation) inference is
prevalent, whereas for segregated contextual diversity experiments (i.e., the referents
are separated in groups and are exhibited with members of their groups only)
reinforcement is predominant. Other experiments are explained with more balanced
doses of reinforcement and inference.
Keywords: statistical learning, word learning, cross-situational learning, associative learning, mutual exclusivity
1. INTRODUCTION
A desirable goal of a psychological theory is to offer explanations
grounded on elementary principles to the data available from
psychology experiments (Newell, 1994). Although most of these
quantitative psychological data are related to mental chronom-
etry and memory accuracy, recent explorations on the human
performance to acquire an artificial lexicon in controlled labo-
ratory conditions have paved the way to the understanding of the
learning strategies humans use to infer a word-object mapping
(Yu and Smith, 2007; Kachergis et al., 2009; Smith et al., 2011;
Kachergis et al., 2012; Yu and Smith, 2012a). These experiments
are based on the cross-situational word-learning paradigm which
avers that a learner can determine the meaning of a word by find-
ing something in common across all observed uses of that word
(Gleitman, 1990; Pinker, 1990). In that sense, learning takes place
through the statistical sampling of the contexts in which a word
appears in accord with the classical associationist stance of Hume
and Locke that the mechanism of word learning is sensitivity to
covariation: if two events occur at the same time, they become
associated (Bloom, 2000).
In a typical cross-situational word-learning experiment, par-
ticipants are exposed repeatedly to multiple unfamiliar objects
concomitantly with multiple spoken pseudo-words, such that a
word and its correct referent (object) always appear together on a
learning trial. Different trials exhibiting distinct word-object pairs
will eventually allow the disambiguation of the word-object asso-
ciations and the learning of the correct mapping (Yu and Smith,
2007). However, it is questionable whether this scenario is suitable
to describe the actual word learning process by children even in
the unambiguous situation where the single novel object is fol-
lowed by the utterance of its corresponding pseudo-word. In fact,
it was shown that young children will only make the connection
between the object and the word provided they have a reason
to believe that they are in presence of an act of naming and for
this the speaker has to be present (Baldwin et al., 1996; Bloom,
2000;Waxman and Gelman, 2009). Adults could learn those asso-
ciations either because they were previously instructed by the
experimenter that they would be learning which words go with
which objects or because they could infer that the disembodied
voice is an act of naming by a concealed person. Although there
have been claims that cross-situational statistical learning is part
of the repertoire of young word learners (Yu and Smith, 2008), the
effect of individual differences in attention and vocabulary devel-
opment of the infants complicates considerably this issue which
is still a matter for debate (Yu and Smith, 2012b; Smith and Yu,
2013).
There are several other alternative or complementary
approaches to the statistical learning formulation of language
acquisition considered in this paper. For instance, the social-
pragmatic hypothesis claims that the child makes the connections
between words and their referents by understanding the refer-
ential intentions of others. This approach, which seems to be
originally due to Augustine, implies that children use intuitive
psychology to “read” the adults’ minds (Bloom, 2000). A more
recent approach that explores the grounding of language in
perception and action has been proved effective in the design of
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linguistic capabilities in humanoid cognitive robots (Cangelosi
et al., 2007; Cangelosi, 2010; Pezzulo et al., 2013) as well as in the
support of word learning by toddlers through the stabilization
of their attention on the selected object (Yu and Smith, 2012b).
In contrast with the unsupervised cross-situational learning
scheme, the scenario known as operant conditioning involves
the active participation of the agents in the learning process,
with exchange of non-linguistic cues to provide feedback on
the learner inferences. This supervised learning scheme has
been applied to the design of a system for communication by
autonomous robots in the Talking Heads experiments (Steels,
2003). We note that a comparison between the cross-situational
and operant conditioning learning schemes indicates that
they perform similarly in the limit of very large lexicon sizes
(Fontanari and Cangelosi, 2011).
As our goal is to interpret the learning performance of adults
using a few plausible reasoning tenets, here we assume that in
order to learn a word-object mapping within the cross-situational
word-learning scenario the learner should be able to (i) recall
at least a fraction of the word-object pairings that appeared in
the learning trials, (ii) register both co-occurrences and non-
co-occurrences of words and objects and (iii) apply the mutual
exclusivity principle which favors the association of novel words
to novel objects (Markman and Wachtel, 1988). Of course, we
note that a hypothetical learner could achieve cross-situational
learning solely by registering and recalling co-occurrences of
words and objects without carrying out any inferential reason-
ing (Blythe et al., 2010; Tilles and Fontanari, 2012a), but we find
it implausible that human learners would not reap the benefits
(e.g., fast mapping) of employing mutual exclusivity (Vogt, 2012;
Reisenauer et al., 2013).
In this paper we offer an adaptive learning algorithm that
comprises two parameters which regulate the associative rein-
forcement of pairings between concurrent words and objects, and
the non-associative inference process that handles built-in biases
(e.g., mutual exclusivity) as well as information of past learning
events. By setting the values of these parameters so as to fit a rep-
resentative selection of experimental data presented in Kachergis
et al. (2009, 2012) we are able to identify and explain the learn-
ing strategies adopted by the participants of those experiments in
terms of a trade-off between reinforcement and inference.
2. CROSS-SITUATIONAL LEARNING SCENARIO
We assume there are N objects o1, . . . , oN , N words w1, . . . ,wN
and a one-to-one mapping between words and objects repre-
sented by the set  = {(w1, o1) , . . . , (wN , oN)}. At each learn-
ing trial, C word-object pairs are selected from  and pre-
sented to the learner without providing any clue on which
word goes with which object. For instance, pictures of the
C objects are displayed in a slide while C pseudo-words
are spoken sequentially such that their spatial and temporal
arrangements do not give away the correct word-object asso-
ciations (Yu and Smith, 2007; Kachergis et al., 2009). We
refer to the subset of words and their referents (objects) pre-
sented to the learner in a learning trial as the context  =
{w1, o1,w2, o2, . . . ,wC, oC}. The context size C is then a measure
of the within-trial ambiguity, i.e., the number of co-occurring
word-object pairs per learning trial. The selection procedure
from the set , which may favor some particular subsets of
word-object pairs, determines the different experimental setups
discussed in this paper. Although each individual trial is highly
ambiguous, repetition of trials with partially overlapping con-
texts should in principle allow the learning of the N word-object
associations.
After the training stage is completed, which typically com-
prises about two dozen trials, the learning accuracy is measured
by instructing the learner to pick the object among the N objects
on display which the learner thinks is associated to a particular
target word. The test is repeated for all N words and the aver-
age learning accuracy calculated as the fraction of correct guesses
(Kachergis et al., 2009).
This cross-situational learning scenario does not account for
the presence of noise, such as the effect of out-of-context words.
This situation can be modeled by assuming that there is a cer-
tain probability (noise) that the referent of one of the spoken
words is not part of the context (so that word can be said to be
out of context). Although theoretical analysis shows that there
is a maximum noise intensity beyond which statistical learning
is unattainable (Tilles and Fontanari, 2012b), as yet no exper-
iment was carried out to verify the existence of this threshold
phenomenon on the learning performance of human subjects.
3. MODEL
We model learning as a change in the confidence with which
the algorithm (or, for simplicity, the learner) associates the word
wi to an object oj that results from the observation and analy-
sis of the contexts presented in the learning trials. More to the
point, this confidence is represented by the probability Pt
(
wi, oj
)
that wi is associated to oj at learning trial t. This probability
is normalized such that
∑
oj
Pt
(
wi, oj
) = 1 for all wi and t > 0,
which then implies that when the word wi is presented to the
learner in the testing stage the learning accuracy is given simply by
Pt(wi, oi). In addition, we assume that Pt
(
wi, oj
)
contains infor-
mation presented in the learning trials up to and including trial t
only.
If at learning trial t the learner observes the context t =
{w1, o1,w2, o2, . . . ,wC, oC} then it can infer the existence of two
other informative sets. First, the set of the words (and their refer-
ents) that appear for the first time at trial t, which we denote by
˜t =
{
w˜1, o˜1, w˜2, o˜2, . . . , w˜C˜, o˜C˜t
}
. Clearly, ˜t ⊆ t and C˜t ≤
C. Second, the set of words (and their referents) that do not
appear in t but that have already appeared in the previous trials,
¯t =
{
w¯1, o¯1, . . . , w¯Nt−C, o¯Nt−C
}
where Nt is the total number
of different words that appeared in contexts up to and including
trial t. Clearly, ¯t ∩ t = ∅. The update rule of the confidences
Pt
(
wi, oj
)
depends on which of these three sets the word wi and
the object oj belong to (if i = j they may belong to different sets).
In fact, our learning algorithm comprises a parameter χ ∈ [0, 1]
that measures the associative reinforcement capacity and applies
only to known words that appear in the current context, and
a parameter β ∈ [0, 1] that measures the inference capacity and
applies either to known words that do not appear in the cur-
rent context or to new words in the current context. Before the
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experiment begins (t = 0) we set P0
(
wi, oj
) = 0 for all words wi
and objects oj. Next we describe how the confidences are updated
following the sequential presentation of contexts.
In the first trial (t = 1) all words are new (C˜1 = N1 = C), so
we set
P1
(
w˜i, o˜j
) = 1
C
(1)
for w˜i, o˜j ∈ ˜ = . In the second or in an arbitrary trial t we
expect to observe contexts exhibiting both novel and repeated
words. Novel words must go through an inference preprocess-
ing stage before the reinforcement procedure can be applied to
them. This is so because if w˜i appears for the first time at trial t
then Pt − 1
(
w˜i, oj
) = 0 for all objects oj and since the reinforce-
ment is proportional to Pt − 1
(
w˜i, oj
)
the confidences associated
to w˜i would never be updated (see Equation 5 and the explana-
tion thereafter). Thus, when a novel word w˜i appear at trial t ≥ 2,
we redefine its confidence values at the previous trial (originally
set to zero) as
Pt − 1
(
w˜i, o˜j
) = β
C˜t
+ 1 − β
Nt − 1 + C˜t
, (2)
Pt − 1
(
w˜i, oj
) = 1 − β
Nt − 1 + C˜t
, (3)
Pt − 1
(
w˜i, o¯j
) = 1 − β
Nt − 1 + C˜t
. (4)
On the one hand, setting the inference parameter β to its maxi-
mum value β = 1 enforces the mutual exclusivity principle which
requires that the new word w˜i be associated with equal probabil-
ity to the C˜t new objects o˜j in the current context. Hence in the
case C˜t = 1 the meaning of the new word would be inferred in a
single presentation. On the other hand, for β = 0 the new word
is associated with equal probability to all objects already seen up
to and including trial t, i.e., Nt = Nt − 1 + C˜t . Intermediate val-
ues of β describe a situation of imperfect inference. Note that
using Equations 2–4 we can easily verify that
∑
o˜j
Pt − 1
(
w˜i, o˜j
)+∑
oj
Pt − 1
(
w˜i, oj
)+∑o¯j Pt − 1
(
w˜i, o¯j
) = 1, in accord with the
normalization constraint.
Now we can focus on the update rule of the confidence
Pt
(
wi, oj
)
in the case both word wi and object oj appear in
the context at trial t. The rule applies both to repeated and
novel words, provided the confidences of the novel words are
preprocessed according to Equations 2–4. In order to fulfill auto-
matically the normalization condition for word wi, the increase of
the confidence Pt
(
wi, oj
)
with oj ∈ t must be compensated by
the decrease of the confidences Pt
(
wi, o¯j
)
with o¯j ∈ ¯t . This can
be implemented by distributing evenly the total flux of probabil-
ity out of the latter confidences, i.e.,
∑
o¯j∈¯t Pt − 1
(
wi, o¯j
)
, over
the confidences Pt
(
wi, oj
)
with oj ∈ t . Hence the net gain of
confidence on the association between wi and oj is given by
rt − 1
(
wi, oj
) = χPt − 1(wi, oj)
∑
o¯j ∈ ¯t Pt − 1
(
wi, o¯j
)
∑
oj ∈t Pt − 1
(
wi, oj
) (5)
where, as mentioned before, the parameter χ ∈ [0, 1] measures
the strength of the reinforcement process. Note that if both oj
and ok appear in the context together with wi then the reinforce-
ment procedure should not create any distinction between the
associations
(
wi, oj
)
and (wi, ok). This result is achieved provided
that the ratio of the confidence gains equals the ratio of the con-
fidences before reinforcement, i.e., rt − 1
(
wi, oj
)
/rt − 1(wi, ok) =
Pt − 1
(
wi, oj
)
/Pt − 1(wi, ok). This is the reason that the reinforce-
ment gain of a word-object association given by Equation 5
is proportional to the previous confidence on that association.
The total increase in the confidences between wi and the objects
that appear in the context, i.e.,
∑
oj ∈t rt − 1
(
wi, oj
)
, equals the
product of χ and the total decrease in the confidences between
wi and the objects that do not appear in the context, i.e.,∑
o¯j ∈ ¯t Pt − 1
(
wi, o¯j
)
. So for χ = 1 the confidences associated to
objects absent from the context are fully transferred to the confi-
dences associated to objects present in the context. Lower values
of χ allows us to control the flow of confidence from objects in
¯t to objects in t .
Most importantly, in order to implement the reinforcement
process the learner should be able to gauge the relevance of the
information about the previous trials, which is condensed on the
confidence values Pt
(
wi, oj
)
. The gauging of this information is
quantified by the word and trial dependent quantity αt(wi) ∈
[0, 1] that allows for the interpolation between the cases of maxi-
mum relevance (αt(wi) = 1) and complete irrelevancy (αt(wi) =
0) of the information stored in the confidences Pt
(
wi, oj
)
. In par-
ticular, we assume that the greater the certainty on the association
between word wi and its referent, the more relevant that informa-
tion is to the learner. A quantitative measure of the uncertainty
associated to the confidences regarding word wi is given by the
entropy
Ht(wi) = −
∑
oj ∈t∪¯t
Pt
(
wi, oj
)
log
[
Pt
(
wi, oj
)]
(6)
whose maximum (logNt) is obtained by the uniform distribution
Pt
(
wi, oj
) = 1/Nt for all oj ∈ t ∪ ¯t , and whose minimum (0)
by Pt
(
wi, oj
) = 1 and Pt(wi, ok) = 0 for ok = oj. So we define
αt(wi) = α0 + (1 − α0)
[
1 − Ht(wi)
logNt
]
, (7)
where α0 ∈ [0, 1] is a baseline information gauge factor corre-
sponding to the maximum uncertainty about the referent of a
target word.
Finally, recalling that at trial t the learner has access to the sets
t , ¯t as well as to the confidences at trial t − 1 we write the
update rule
Pt
(
wi, oj
) = Pt − 1(wi, oj)+ αt − 1(wi)rt − 1 (wi, oj)
+ [1 − αt − 1 (wi)]
[
1
Nt
− Pt − 1
(
wi, oj
)]
(8)
for wi, oj ∈ t . Note that if αt − 1(wi) = 0 the learner would
associate word wi to all objects that have appeared up to and
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including trial t with equal probability. This situation happens
only if α0 = 0 and if there is complete uncertainty about the ref-
erent of word wi. Hence the quantity αt(wi) determines the extent
to which the previous confidences on associations involving word
wi influence the update of those confidences.
Now we consider the update rule for the confidence Pt
(
wi, o¯j
)
in the case that word wi appears in the context at trial t but object
o¯j does not. (We recall that object o¯j must have appeared in some
previous trial.) According to the reasoning that led to Equation 5
this confidence must decrease by the amount χPt − 1
(
wi, o¯j
)
and
so, taking into account the information gauge factor, we obtain
Pt
(
wi, o¯j
) = Pt − 1(wi, o¯j)− αt − 1(wi)χPt − 1(wi, o¯j)
+ [1 − αt − 1(wi)]
[
1
Nt
− Pt − 1
(
wi, o¯j
)]
(9)
which can be easily seen to satisfy the normalization
∑
oj ∈t
Pt
(
wi, oj
)+ ∑
o¯j ∈ ¯t
Pt
(
wi, o¯j
) = 1. (10)
We focus now on the update rule for the confidence Pt
(
w¯i, o¯j
)
with w¯i, o¯j ∈ ¯t , i.e., both the word w¯i and the object o¯j are
absent from the context shown at trial t, but they have already
appeared, not necessarily together, in previous trials. A similar
inference reasoning that led to the expressions for the preprocess-
ing of new words would allow the learner to conclude that a word
absent from the context should be associated to an object that is
also absent from it. In that sense, confidence should flow from the
associations between w¯i and objects oj ∈ t to the associations
between w¯i and objects o¯j ∈ ¯t . Hence, ignoring the information
gauge factor for the moment, the net gain to confidence Pt
(
w¯i, o¯j
)
is given by
r¯t − 1
(
w¯i, o¯j
) = βPt − 1(w¯i, o¯j)
∑
oj ∈t Pt − 1
(
w¯i, oj
)
∑
o¯j ∈ ¯t Pt − 1
(
w¯i, o¯j
) . (11)
The direct proportionality of this gain to Pt − 1
(
w¯i, o¯j
)
can be jus-
tified by an argument similar to that used to justify Equation 5 in
the case of reinforcement. The information relevance issue is also
handled in a similar manner so the desired update rule reads
Pt
(
w¯i, o¯j
) = Pt − 1(w¯i, o¯j)+ αt − 1(w¯i) r¯t − 1(w¯i, o¯j)
+ [1 − αt − 1(w¯i)]
[
1
Nt
− Pt − 1
(
w¯i, o¯j
)]
(12)
for w¯i, o¯j ∈ ¯t . To ensure normalization the confidence
Pt
(
w¯i, oj
)
must decrease by an amount proportional to
βPt − 1
(
w¯i, oj
)
so that
Pt
(
w¯i, oj
) = Pt − 1(w¯i, oj)− αt − 1(w¯i) βPt − 1(w¯i, oj)
+ [1 − αt − 1(w¯i)]
[
1
Nt
− Pt − 1
(
w¯i, oj
)]
(13)
for w¯i ∈ ¯t and oj ∈ t . We can verify that prescriptions (12)
and (13) satisfy the normalization
∑
o¯j ∈ ¯t
Pt
(
w¯i, o¯j
)+ ∑
oj ∈t
Pt
(
w¯i, oj
) = 1, (14)
as expected.
In summary, before any trial (t = 0) we set all confidence
values to zero, i.e., P0
(
wi, oj
) = 0, and fix the values of the param-
eters α0, χ and β. In the first trial (t = 1) we set the confidences
of the words and objects in 1 according to Equation (1), so we
have the values of P1
(
wi, oj
)
for wi, oj ∈ 1. In the second trial,
we separate the novel words w˜i ∈ ˜2 and reset P1
(
w˜i, oj
)
with
oi ∈ 2 ∪ ¯2 according to Equations 2–4. Only then we calculate
α1(wi) with wi ∈ 1 ∪ ˜2 using Equation (7). The confidences
at trial t = 2 then follows from Equations (8), (9), (12), and (13).
As before, in the third trial we separate the novel words w˜i ∈ ˜3,
reset P2
(
w˜i, oj
)
with oi ∈ 3 ∪ ¯3 according to Equations 2–4,
calculate α2(wi) with wi ∈ 1 ∪ 2 ∪ ˜3 using Equation (7),
and only then resume the evaluation of the confidences at trial
t = 3. This procedure is repeated until the training stage is com-
pleted, say, at t = t∗. At this point, knowledge of the confidence
values Pt∗
(
wi, oj
)
allows us to answer any question posed in the
testing stage.
Our model borrows many features from other proposed mod-
els of word learning (Siskind, 1996; Fontanari et al., 2009; Frank
et al., 2009; Fazly et al., 2010; Kachergis et al., 2012). In particu-
lar, the entropy expression (6) was used by Kachergis et al. (2012)
to allocate attention trial-by-trail to the associations presented in
the contexts. Here we use that expression to quantify the uncer-
tainty associated to the various confidences in order to determine
the extent to which those confidences are updated on a learning
trial. A distinctive feature of our model is the update of asso-
ciations that are not in the current trial according to Equation
(12). In particular, we note that whereas ad hoc normalization can
only decrease the confidences on associations between words and
objects that did not appear in the current context, our update rule
can increase those associations as well. The extent of this update
is weighted by the inference parameter β and it allows the appli-
cation of mutual exclusivity to associations that are not shown in
the current context. In fact, the splitting of mental processes in
two classes, namely, reinforcement processes that update associ-
ations in the current context and inference processes that update
the other associations is the main thrust of our paper. In the next
section we evaluate the adequacy of our model to describe a selec-
tion of cross-situational word-learning experiments carried out
on adult subjects by Kachergis et al. (2009, 2012).
4. RESULTS
The cross-situational word-learning experiments of Kachergis
et al. (2009, 2012) aimed to understand how word sampling
frequency (i.e., number of trials in which a word appears), contex-
tual diversity (i.e., the co-occurrence of distinct words or groups
of words in the learning trials), within-trial ambiguity (i.e., the
context size C), and fast-mapping of novel words affect the learn-
ing performance of adult subjects. In this section we compare
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the performance of the algorithm described in the previous sec-
tion with the performance of adult subjects reported in Kachergis
et al. (2009, 2012). In particular, once the conditions of the train-
ing stage are specified, we carry out 104 runs of our algorithm
for fixed values of the three parameters α0, β, χ, and then cal-
culate the average accuracy at trial t = t∗ over all those runs
for that parameter setting. Since the algorithm is deterministic,
what changes in each run is the composition of the contexts at
each learning trial. As our goal is to model the results of the
experiments, we search the space of parameters to find the set-
ting such that the performance of the algorithm matches that of
humans within the error bars (i.e., one standard deviation) of the
experiments.
4.1. WORD SAMPLING FREQUENCY
In these experiments the number of words (and objects) is N =
18 and the training stage totals t∗ = 27 learning trials, with each
trial comprising the presentation of 4 words together with their
referents (C = 4). Following Kachergis et al. (2009), we inves-
tigate two conditions which differ with respect to the number
of times a word is exhibited in the training stage. In the two-
frequency condition, the 18 words are divided into two subsets
of 9 words each. The words in the first subset appear 9 times and
those in the second only 3 times. In the three-frequency condi-
tion, the 18 words are divided into three subsets of 6 words each.
Words in the first subset appear 3 times, in the second, 6 times
and in the third, 9 times. In these two conditions, the same word
was not allowed to appear in two consecutive learning trials.
Figures 1, 2 summarize ourmain results for the two-frequency
and three-frequency conditions, respectively. The left panels show
the regions (shaded areas) in the (χ, β) plane for fixed α0 where
the algorithm describes the experimental data. We note that if
those regions are located left to the diagonal χ = β then the infer-
ence process is dominant whereas if they are right to the diagonal
then reinforcement is the dominant process. The middle panels
show the accuracy of the best fit as function of the parameter α0
and the right panels exhibit the values of χ and β corresponding
to that fit. The broken horizontal lines and the shaded zones
around them represent the means and standard deviations of
the results of experiments carried out with 33 adult subjects
(Kachergis et al., 2009).
It is interesting that although the words sampled more fre-
quently are learned best in the two-frequency condition as
expected, this advantage practically disappears in the three-
frequency condition in which case all words are learned at equal
levels within the experimental error. Note that the average accu-
racy for the words sampled 3 times is actually greater than
the accuracy for the words sampled 6 times, but this inver-
sion is not statistically significant, although, most surprisingly,
the algorithm does reproduce it for α0 ∈ [0.7, 0.8]. According
to Kachergis et al. (2009), the reason for the observed sam-
pling frequency insensitivity might be because the high-frequency
words are learned quickly and once they are learned subse-
quent trials containing those words will exhibit an effectively
smaller within-trial ambiguity. In this vein, the inversion could
be explained if by chance the words less frequently sampled were
generally paired with the highly sampled words. Thus, contex-
tual diversity seems to play a key role in cross-situational word
learning.
4.2. CONTEXTUAL DIVERSITY ANDWITHIN-TRIAL AMBIGUITY
In the first experiment aiming to probe the role of contextual
diversity in the cross-situational learning, the 18 words were
divided in two groups of 6 and 12 words each, and the contexts of
size C = 3 were formed with words belonging to the same group
only. Since the sampling frequency was fixed to 6 repetitions for
each word, those words belonging to the more numerous group
are exposed to a larger contextual diversity (i.e., the variety of dif-
ferent words with which a given word appear in the course of
the training stage). The results summarized in Figure 3 indicate
clearly that contextual diversity enhances the learning accuracy.
Perhaps more telling is the finding that incorrect responses are
FIGURE 1 | Summary of the results for the two-frequency condition
experiment. Left panel: Regions in the plane (χ, β) where the algorithm fits
the experimental data for fixed α0 as indicated in the figure. Middle panel:
Average accuracy for the best fit to the results of Experiment 1 of Kachergis
et al. (2009) represented by the broken horizontal lines (means) and shaded
regions around them (one standard deviation). The blue symbols represent
the accuracy for the group of words sampled 9 times whereas the red
symbols represent the accuracy for the words sampled 3 times. Right panel:
Parameters χ and β corresponding to the best fit shown in the middle panel.
The other parameters are N = 18 and C = 4.
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FIGURE 2 | Summary of the results for the three-frequency condition
experiment. Left panel: Regions in the plane (χ, β) where the algorithm fits
the experimental data for fixed α0 as indicated in the figure. Middle panel:
Average accuracy for the best fit to the results of Experiment 1 of Kachergis
et al. (2009) represented by the broken horizontal lines (means) and shaded
regions around them (one standard deviation). The blue symbols represent
the accuracy for the group of words sampled 9 times, the green symbols for
the words sampled 6 times, and the red symbols for the words sampled 3
times. Right panel: Parameters χ and β corresponding to the best fit shown
in the middle panel. The other parameters are N = 18 and C = 4.
FIGURE 3 | Summary of the results of the two-level contextual
diversity experiment. Left panel: Regions in the plane (χ, β) where the
algorithm fits the experimental data for fixed α0 as indicated in the
figure. Middle panel: Average accuracy for the best fit to the results of
Experiment 2 of Kachergis et al. (2009) represented by the broken
horizontal lines (means) and shaded regions around them (one standard
deviation). The blue symbols represent the accuracy for the group of
words belonging to the 12-components subgroup and the red symbols
for the words belonging to the 6-components subgroup. All words are
repeated exactly 6 times during the t∗ = 27 learning trials. Right panel:
Parameters χ and β corresponding to the best fit shown in the middle
panel. The other parameters are N = 18 and C = 3.
largely due to misassignments to referents whose words belong
to the same group of the test word. In particular, Kachergis et al.
(2009) found that this type of error accounts for 56% of incor-
rect answers when the test word belongs to the 6-components
subgroup and for 76% when it belongs to the 12-components
subgroup. The corresponding statistics for our algorithmwith the
optimal parameters set at α0 = 0.9 are 43% and 70%, respectively.
The region in the space of parameters where the model can be
said to describe the experimental data is greatly reduced in this
experiment and even the best fit is barely within the error bars.
It is interesting that, contrasting with the previous experiments,
in this case the reinforcement procedure seems to play the more
important role in the performance of the algorithm.
The effect of the context size or within-trial ambiguity is
addressed by the experiment summarized in Figure 4, which is
similar to the previous experiment, except that the words that
compose the context are chosen uniformly from the entire reper-
toire of N = 18 words. Two context sizes are considered, namely,
C = 3 and C = 4. In both cases, there is a large selection of
parameter values that explain the experimental data, yielding
results indistinguishable from the experimental average accura-
cies. This is the reason we do not exhibit a graph akin to those
shown in the right panels of the previous figures. Since a per-
fect fitting can be obtained both for χ > β and for χ < β, this
experiment is uninformative with respect to these two abilities.
As expected, increase of the within-trial ambiguity difficilitate
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FIGURE 4 | Summary of the results of the experiments where all
words co-occur without constraint and the N = 18 words are
repeated exactly 6 times during the t∗ = 27 learning trials. Left
panel: Regions in the plane (χ, β) where the algorithm fits the
experimental data for fixed α0 and context size C = 3. Middle panel:
Same as the left panel but for context size C = 4. Right panel: Average
accuracy for the best fitting of the results of Experiment 2 of Kachergis
et al. (2009) represented by the broken horizontal lines (means) and
shaded regions around them (one standard deviation). The red symbols
are for C = 3 and the blue symbols for C = 4.
learning. In addition, the (experimental) results for C = 3 yield
a learning accuracy value that is intermediary to those measured
for the 6 and 12-components subgroups, which is in agree-
ment with the conclusion that the increase of the contextual
diversity enhances learning, since the mean number of different
co-occurring words is 4.0 in the 6-components subgroup, 9.2 in
the 12-components subgroup and 8.8 in the uniformly mixed
situation (Kachergis et al., 2009).
4.3. FAST MAPPING
The experiments carried out by Kachergis et al. (2012) were
designed to elicit participants’ use of the mutual exclusivity
principle (i.e., the assumption of one-to-one mappings between
words and referents) and to test the flexibility of a learned word-
object association when new evidence is provided in support to
a many-to-many mapping. To see how mutual exclusivity implies
fast mapping assume that a learner who knows the association
(w1, o1) is exposed to the context  = {w1, o1,w2, o2} in which
the word w2 (and its referent) appears for the first time. Then it
is clear that a mutual-exclusivity-biased learner would infer the
association (w2, o2) in this single trial. However, a purely associa-
tive learner would give equal weights to o1 and o2 if asked about
the referent of w2.
In the specific experiment we address in this section, N =
12 words and their referents are split up into two groups
of 6 words each, say A = {(w1, o1) , . . . , (w6, o6)} and B =
{(w7, o7) , . . . , (w12, o12)}. The context size is set to C = 2 and
the training stage is divided in two phases. In the early phase, only
the words belonging to group A are presented and the duration of
this phase is set such that each word is repeated 3, 6 or 9 times.
In the late phase, the contexts consist of one word belonging to
A and one belonging to B forming fixed couples, i.e., whenever
wi appears in a context, wi+6, with i = 1, . . . , 6, must appear
too. The duration of the late phase depends on the number of
repetitions of each word that can be 3, 6, or 9 as in the early
phase (Kachergis et al., 2012). The combinations of the sampling
frequencies yield 9 different training conditions but here we will
consider only the case that the late phase comprises 6 repetitions
of each word.
The testing stage comprises the play of a single word, say
w1, and the display of 11 of the 12 trained objects (Kachergis
et al., 2012). Each word was tested twice with a time lag between
the tests: once without its corresponding early object (o1 in the
case) and once without its late object (o7 in the case). This pro-
cedure requires that we renormalize the confidences for each
test. For instance, in the case o1 is left out of the display, the
renormalization is
Pt∗
′(w1, oj) = Pt∗(w1, oj) / ∑
ok =o1
Pt∗(w1, ok) (15)
with j = 2, . . . , 12 so that ∑oj =o1 Pt∗ ′
(
w1, oj
) = 1. Similarly, in
the case o7 is left out the renormalization becomes
Pt∗
′(w1, oj) = Pt∗(w1, oj) / ∑
ok =o7
Pt∗(w1, ok) (16)
with j = 1, . . . , 6, 8, . . . , 12 so that ∑oj =o7 Pt∗ ′
(
w1, oj
) = 1. We
are interested on the (renormalized) confidences Pt∗ ′(w1, o1),
Pt∗ ′(w1, o7), Pt∗ ′(w7, o7), and Pt∗ ′(w7, o1), which are shown in
Figures 5, 6 for the conditions where words wi, i = 1, . . . , 6 are
repeated 3 (left panel), 6 (middle panel), and 9 (right panel) times
in the early learning phase, and the words wi, i = 1, . . . , 12 are
repeated 6 times in the late phase. The figures exhibit the perfor-
mance of the algorithm for the set of parameters χ and β that
fits best the experimental data of Kachergis et al. (2012) for fixed
α0. This optimum set is shown in Figure 7 for the 6 early repe-
tition condition, which is practically indistinguishable from the
optima of the other two conditions. The conditions with the dif-
ferent word repetitions in the early phase intended to produce
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FIGURE 5 | Results of the experiments on mutual exclusivity in the case
the late phase of the training process comprises 6 repetitions of each
word. The blue symbols represent the probability that the algorithm picks
object o1 as the referent of word w1 whereas the red symbols represent the
probability it picks o7. The broken horizontal lines and the shaded zones
around them represent the experimental means and standard deviations
(Kachergis et al., 2012) represented by the broken horizontal lines (means)
and shaded regions around them (one standard deviation). The left panel
shows the results for 3 repetitions of w1 in the early training phase, the
middle panel for 6 repetitions and the right panel for 9 repetitions. The results
correspond to the parameters χ and β that best fit the experimental data for
fixed α0.
FIGURE 6 | Results of the experiments on mutual exclusivity in the case
the late phase of the training process comprises 6 repetitions of each
word. The green symbols represent the probability that the algorithm picks
object o7 as the referent of word w7 whereas the orange symbols represent
the probability it picks o1. The broken horizontal lines and the shaded zones
around them represent the experimental means and standard deviations
(Kachergis et al., 2012) represented by the broken horizontal lines (means)
and shaded regions around them (one standard deviation). The left panel
shows the results for 3 repetitions of w1 in the early training phase, the
middle panel for 6 repetitions and the right panel for 9 repetitions. The results
correspond to the parameters χ and β that best fit the experimental data for
fixed α0.
distinct confidences on the learned association (w1, o1) before the
onset of the late phase in the training stage. The insensitivity of
the results to these conditions probably indicates that association
was already learned well enough with 3 repetitions only. Finally,
we note that, though the testing stage focused on words w1 and
w7 only, all word pairs wi and wi+6 with i = 1, . . . , 6 are strictly
equivalent since they appear the same number of times during the
training stage.
The experimental results exhibited in Figure 6 offer indirect
evidence that the participants have resorted to mutual exclusiv-
ity to produce their word-object mappings. In fact, from the
perspective of a purely associative learner, word w7 should be
associated to objects o1 or o7 only, but since in the testing stage
one of those objects was not displayed, such a learner would surely
select the correct referent. However, the finding that Pt∗ ′ (w7, o7)
is considerably greater than Pt∗ ′ (w7, o1) (they should be equal
for an associative learner) indicates that there is a bias against
the association (w7, o1) which is motivated, perhaps, from the
previous understanding that o1 was the referent of word w1.
In fact, a most remarkable result revealed by Figure 6 is that
Pt∗ ′ (w7, o7) < 1. Since word w7 appeared only in the late phase
context  = {w1, o1,w7, o7} and object o1 was not displayed in
the testing stage, we must conclude that the participants pro-
duced spurious associations between words and objects that
never appeared together in a context. Our algorithm accounts
for these associations through Equation (4) in the case of new
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words and, more importantly, through eqs. (9) and (13) due
to the effect of the information efficiency factor αt (wi). The
experimental data is well described only in the narrow range
α0 ∈ [0.85, 0.9].
Figure 8 exhibits the developmental timeline of the cross-
situational learning history of the algorithm with the optimal
set of parameters (see the figure caption) for the three differ-
ent training conditions in the early training phase. This phase is
characterized by the steady growth of the confidence on the asso-
ciation (w1, o1) (blue symbols) accompanied by the decrease of
the confidence on association (w1, o7) (red symbols). As the word
w7 does not appear in the early training phase, the confidences
on its association with any object remain constant correspond-
ing to the accuracy value 1/11 (we recall that o1 is left out of the
FIGURE 7 | Parameters χ (reinforcement strength) and β (inference
strength) corresponding to the best fit shown in Figures 5 and 6 in the
case word w1 is repeated 6 times in the early training phase.
display in the testing stage). The beginning of the late training
stage is marked by a steep increase of the confidence on the associ-
ation (w7, o7) (green symbols) whereas the confidence on (w1, o1)
decreases gradually. A similar gradual increase is observed on
the confidence on the association (w7, o1) (orange symbols). As
expected, for large t all confidences presented in this figure tend to
the same value, since the words w1 and w7 always appear together
in the context  = {w1, o1,w7, o7}. Finally, we note that this
developmental timeline is qualitatively similar to that produced
by the algorithm proposed by Kachergis et al. (2012).
5. DISCUSSION
The chief purpose of this paper is to understand and model
the mental processes used by human subjects to produce
their word-object mappings in the controlled cross-situational
word-learning scenarios devised by Yu and Smith (2007) and
Kachergis et al. (2009, 2012). In other words, we seek to ana-
lyze the psychological phenomena involved in the production
of those mappings. Accordingly, we assume that the comple-
tion of that task requires the existence of two cognitive abil-
ities, namely, the associative capacity to create and reinforce
associations between words and referents that co-occur in a
context, and the non-associative capacity to infer word-object
associations based on previous learning events, which accounts
for the mutual exclusivity principle, among other things. In
order to regulate the effectiveness of these two capacities we
introduce the parameters χ ∈ [0, 1], which yields the reinforce-
ment strength, and β ∈ [0, 1], which determines the inference
strength.
In addition, since the reinforcement and inference processes
require storage, use and transmission of past and present infor-
mation (coded mainly on the values of the confidences Pt
(
wi, oj
)
)
we introduce a word-dependent quantity αt(wi) ∈ [0, 1] which
gauges the impact of the confidences at trial t − 1 on the update
of the confidences at trial t. In particular, the greater the certainty
FIGURE 8 | Knowledge development for the model parameters that best
fit the results of the mutual exclusivity experiments summarized in
Figures 5, 6 in the case the late phase of the training process comprises
6 repetitions of each word. The symbol colors follow the convention used in
those figures, i.e., the blue symbols represent the confidence on association
(w1,o1), the red symbols on association (w1,o7), the green symbols on
association (w7,o7) and the orange symbols on association (w7,o1). The left
panel shows the results for 3 repetitions of w1 in the early training phase
(α0 = 0.85, χ = 0.25, β = 0.95), the middle panel for 6 repetitions (α0 = 0.85,
χ = 0.45, β = 0.99) and the right panel for 9 repetitions (α0 = 0.85, χ = 0.4,
β = 0.95). For each trial t the symbols represent the average over 105
realizations of the learning process.
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about the referent of word wi, the greater the relevance of the pre-
vious confidences. However, there is a baseline information gauge
factor α0 ∈ [0, 1] used to process words for which the uncertainty
about their referents is maximum. The adaptive expression for
αt(wi) given in Equation (7) seems to be critical for the fitting
of the experimental data. In fact, our first choice was to use a
constant information gauge factor (i.e., αt(wi) = α ∀t,wi) with
which we were able to describe only the experiments summarized
in Figures 1, 4 (data not shown). Note that a consequence of pre-
scription (7) is that once the referent of a word is learned with
maximum confidence (i.e., Pt
(
wi, oj
) = 1 and Pt(wi, ok) = 0 for
ok = oj) it is never forgotten.
The algorithm described in Section 3 comprises three free
parameters χ, β and α0 which are adjusted so as to fit a represen-
tative selection of the experimental data presented in Kachergis
et al. (2009, 2012). A robust result from all experiments is that the
baseline information gauge factor is in the range 0.7 < α0 < 1.
Actually, the fast mapping experiments narrow this interval down
to 0.85 < α0 < 0.9. This is a welcome result because we do not
have a clear-cut interpretation for α0—it encompasses storage,
processing and transmission of information—and so the fact that
this parameter does not vary much for wildly distinct experimen-
tal settings is evidence that, whatever its meaning, it is not relevant
to explain the learning strategies used in the different experimen-
tal conditions. Fortunately, this is not the case for the two other
parameters χ and β.
For instance, in the fast mapping experiments discussed in
Subsection 4.3 the best fit of the experimental data is achieved
for β ≈ 1 indicating thus the extensive use of mutual exclusivity,
and inference in general, by the participants of those experi-
ments. Moreover, in that case the best fit corresponds to a low
(but non-zero) value of χ, which is expected since for contexts
that exhibit two associations (C = 2) only, most of the disam-
biguations are likely to be achieved solely through inference. This
contrasts with the experiments on variable word sampling fre-
quencies discussed in Subsection 4.1, for which the best fit is
obtained with intermediate values of β and χ so the participants’
use of reinforcement and inference was not too unbalanced. The
contextual diversity experiment of Subsection 4.2, in which the
words are segregated in two isolated groups of 12 and 6 compo-
nents, offers another extreme learning situation, since the best fit
corresponds to χ ≈ 1 and β ≈ 0 in that case. To understand this
result, first we recall that most of the participants’ errors were due
to misassignments of referents belonging to the same group of
the test word, and those confidences were strengthened mainly
by the reinforcement process. Second, in contrast to the infer-
ence process, which creates and strengthens spurious intergroup
associations via Equation (12), the reinforcement process solely
weakens those associations via Equation (9). Thus, considering
the learning conditions of the contextual diversity experiment
it is no surprise that reinforcement was the participants’ choice
strategy.
It is interesting to note that the optimal set of parameters that
describe the fast mapping experiments (see Figures 5–8) indi-
cate that there is a trade-off in the values of those parameters,
in the sense that high values of the inference parameter β require
low values of the reinforcement parameter χ. Since this is not an
artifact of the model which poses no constrain on those values
(e.g., they are both large for small α0), the trade-off may reveal a
limitation on the amount of attentional resources available to the
learner to distribute among the two distinct mental processes.
Our results agree with the findings of Smith et al. (2011) that
participants use various learning strategies, which in our case are
determined by the values of the parameters χ and β, depending
on the specific conditions of the cross-situational word-learning
experiment. In particular, in the case of low within-trial ambi-
guity those authors found that participants generally resorted to
a rigorous eliminative approach to infer the correct word-object
mapping. This is exactly the conclusion we reached in the anal-
ysis of the fast mapping experiment for which the within-trial
ambiguity takes the lowest possible value (C = 2).
Although the adaptive learning algorithm presented in
this paper reproduced the performance of adult participants
in cross-situational word-learning experiments quite success-
fully, the deterministic nature of the algorithm hindered
somewhat the psychological interpretation of the informa-
tion gauge factor αt (wi). In fact, not only learning and
behavior are best described as stochastic processes (Atkinson
et al., 1965) but also the modeling of those processes requires
(and facilitates) a precise interpretation of the model param-
eters, since they are introduced in the model as transition
probabilities.
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